Just the Facts | Upcoming Elections in France, Sweden and Spain

Upcoming Elections in France, Sweden and Spain – and Implications for the EU

Over the next year, a number of EU member states will hold elections. As national governments shape negotiations at EU Council level, the outcomes of these elections will have implications for the functioning of the EU going forward. In May 2027, French presidential elections will take place. Spanish citizens will elect a new government by August 2027, and Sweden will form a new government following elections in September 2026. This Just the Facts provides an overview of these three key elections, which are taking place in the context of a strengthened far-right in Europe, and their implications for the EU.

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France

Political context

The presidential election in France in 2027 is one of the most significant upcoming elections in the EU. the semi-presidential system under which the French government operates, the President wields a considerable amount of power, with the authority to direct foreign policy, appoint a Prime Minister and dissolve parliament. Presidential elections in France operate under a two-round system, whereby a candidate must receive at least 50% of the votes in the first round to win – otherwise, a second round takes place between the two candidates with the highest number of votes. The candidate who receives the majority in the second round is elected President for a five-year term. Elections are currently scheduled to take place on 18 April 2027, with a runoff election for the top two candidates planned for 2 May 2027.

This election marks the end of the Emmanuel Macron era. Macron, whose Presidency has spanned two terms since 2017, is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term, and, as a result, the field is open for a new challenger. June 2024 already marked a turning point in France’s relationship with the EU, when the far-right populist party Rassemblement National (RN) secured a sweeping victory in the European elections. This prompted Macron to dissolve the Assemblée Nationale, the lower house of the French Parliament, and call a snap legislative election that saw the left-wing coalition Nouveau Front Populaire emerge victorious. However, it fell short of an absolute majority, leaving France in a political . The outcome of the 2027 presidential election could resolve this gridlock as the President holds the power to call another snap election – ahead of the next parliamentary election scheduled for 2029.

Le Pen and the Rassemblement National’s leadership challenge

On 7 July 2026, the Court of Appeal reduced Le Pen’s ineligibility penalty following her conviction on embezzlement charges and issued a one-year term to be served wearing an electronic ankle tag under house arrest. Until the court reaches a decision, the sentences handed down on appeal remain suspended, thus making her eligible for the 2027 presidential election. That same evening, Le Pen announced that she would indeed run for the presidency and positioned Jordan Bardella as a prospective Prime Minister.

Bardella is a thirty-year-old politician who has had a meteoric rise over the past years. Although he is viewed as less Eurosceptic than Le Pen, he has advocated to scale back EU influence within France and is regarded as no less of a threat. Le Pen’s decision to run has been seen by some as stymying his ascent. In positioning Bardella as prospective Prime Minister, Le Pen hopes to use his substantial appeal to get her campaign over the line.

Other contesters

In the political centre/centre-right, three candidates have emerged so far. Former French Prime Ministers Édouard Phillippe, Bruno Retailleau and Gabriel Attal all served under Emmanuel Macron, but have since distanced themselves from the incumbent French President. Phillippe managed to take mayoralty of Le Havre in a closely fought election in 2020, elevating his status and providing him with a greater platform. Retailleau, leader of Les Républicains, will be pitted against Philippe, who will be looking to obtain the support of his former party in the first round. Attal was France’s youngest ever Prime Minister, but fell out with Macron in 2024 after the President dissolved parliament without consulting him.

To the left, a range of candidates have emerged, but the question of who to unite behind remains open. Jean-Luc , leader of the far-left party La France Insoumise, will be attempting his fourth presidential bid. Despite previously vowing to step aside, the veteran of the left now claims to be the best placed to challenge RN, but his candidacy has raised eyebrows following accusations of antisemitism against him from across the political spectrum. Meanwhile Raphaël Glucksmann, current French MEP, and Oliver Fauré of the Socialist Party will go head-to-head to secure their place in an already crowded field.

To avoid splitting the vote, several left-wing leaders have organised a preliminary election over the weekends of 11 and 18 October 2026, but who will take part is yet to be confirmed. In addition, there is speculation about further candidates, with key figures including ex-Prime Minister and EU Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier, although none have declared their candidacy.

As of 24 August, the Toluna Harris Interactive polls – which surveys voting intentions in various hypothetical situations – suggest that a win by RN is edging closer to reality. In the five first-round scenarios tested, Le Pen would come out far ahead with 35% to 38%, depending on the configurations. Mélenchon is placed next likely to qualify for the second round but is neck-to-neck with top centrist contender, Philippe. A best-case scenario would be if both Philippe and Attal ran, which would put Mélenchon at 17%, and them at 14% and 8% respectively. If former French President François Hollande from the Socialist Party were to enter the fray, Mélenchon would be overtaken by Philippe by 2 points (19%) but would remain ahead of Attal at 14%. Mélenchon’s strong standing has prompted the French Greens to consider backing his candidacy, despite points of contention, as party leader Marine Tondelier struggles to break through in the polls. Such an alliance could improve Mélenchon’s chances of reaching the second round.

Implications for the EU

France is often considered half of the EU’s “engine”, having powered much of the post-war project. This makes the outcome of the French presidential elections all the more significant for the EU. In particular, a victory by RN – potentially reflecting the widening gap between Macron’s pro-EU agenda and attitudes among the French electorate towards the EU – could present a serious threat to EU cohesion. The long reign of former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán demonstrated how one national leader can veto decisions in Brussels and hamper the EU as a whole. His ousting in April 2026 as aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. Should Le Pen win, the EU risks having another Orbán-level disrupter in one of its main capitals. While the far-right RN has stepped away from their previous calls for a ‘Frexit’, their roots are still firmly placed in combatting “EU Technocracy” by systematically challenging the perceived legal, political and financial constraints of the EU from within.

The most immediate impact of a Le Pen presidency would likely be on the EU’s next long-term budget, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Bardella advocated to halve France’s contribution to the EU budget – a significant proposal, given France is currently the second largest contributor to the EU. Under an RN presidency, France would likely seek to reduce its contributions towards the EU with a rebate, similar to the one Germany and the Netherlands receive. If tensions were to boil over, the EU could witness a modern-day empty chair crisis with France completely withdrawing from talks. This puts Ireland, as current President of the Council of the EU, under pressure to conclude negotiations on the EU’s long-term budget for 2028-2034 before the end of 2026.

Another key aspect of the RN’s position is its opposition to further EU enlargement. The party argues that enlargement could have broader implications for France, such as intensifying EU budgetary demands, posing risks to French agriculture and suppressing French wages, while further centralising power at EU level. In particular, the RN is opposed to EU membership for Ukraine. The party has adopted an ambiguous position since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, such as voting against resolutions on aid and criticising sanctions against Russia, while acknowledging Ukraine’s right to self-defence. Bardella has repeatedly warned that the entry of Ukraine’s large agricultural industry into the EU would mark the end of French agriculture, while Le Pen has spoken out against promising Ukraine EU accession, arguing that it could pose a serious risk to peace on the European continent.

With regard to migration, RN would seek to establish the primacy of French law over EU law, which would fundamentally contravene EU rules. Using migration as a focal point, RN would likely seek to build a European “union of the right”. In June 2026, Bardella met with leaders of the Polish right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) to prepare for the “Europe of tomorrow” and mentioned he would seek to work with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. In short, a win for RN would embolden much of Europe’s radical right and have serious implications for EU values and its functioning.

But Le Pen is not the only candidate in this election that could upend the status quo in the EU. Mélenchon, dubbed the ‘French Jeremy Corbyn’, is in its current form. He has since softened his tone in favour of bread-and-butter policies, but a government under Mélenchon could significantly complicate bilateral and European cooperation on certain policy issues. His criticism of the EU stems in part from a belief that the EU serves primarily Berlin’s economic interests, and as a result he would seek to dismantle the Franco-German relationship. For example, this month, he said he would not commit to a recent series of agreements between current French President Macron and German Chancellor Merz on issues ranging from nuclear deterrence to industrial policy. He has also pledged that France would leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and expressed an interest in strengthening ties with China. But for now, a Mélenchon victory is not seen as likely, and attention remains fixed on the prospect of an RN win.

Spain

Political context

The next Spanish elections, due to be held no later than 22 August 2027, are shaping up to be decisive both for the direction of Spain and of the EU as a whole. General elections are held every four years, with seats allocated through a system of proportional representation. Under a closed list system, voters cast their ballots for political parties rather than individual candidates. To be eligible to win a seat, a party must receive at least 3% of votes cast (including blank ballots), which ensures that only parties with a minimum level of electoral support are represented.

Spain is a bicameral parliamentary monarchy, with the Prime Minister as head of government and the monarch as head of state. The PM is the head of government and is elected to the Congress of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados). Together the Congress and the Senate (Senado) form the General Courts (Cortes Generales). Under the Constitution, the Congress of Deputies must be composed of between 300 and 400 deputies. It currently has 350, who are elected through 50 multi-seat constituencies across Spain’s 50 provinces and the two North African autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla.

At present, the Spanish government consists of a coalition of left-wing parties and Catalonian and Basque separatist parties. The central government party is Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s Socialist Party (PSOE), with support from a coalition of left-wing parties known as the Sumar Alliance. Sánchez faced criticism in the previous general elections both internally and externally for relying on support from separatist parties in forming a government (read more about Spain’s last general election in 2023 here). As it stands, the current Spanish government is reliant on support from separatist groups on a vote-by-vote basis. Sánchez and PSOE have also repeatedly found themselves in hot water due to allegations of corruption on the part of Sánchez’s wife, brother and several PSOE parliamentary members.

While an election date has not been formally set, 22 August 2027 is the deadline for an election to be called. Less than a year away, political maneuvering has already begun among Spain’s parties. The main competition for PSOE comes from a combination of the People’s Party (PP) and Vox, which sit on the centre-right and far-right of the political spectrum, respectively. Vox is a breakaway party from the PP and casts itself as a defender of European nations and their citizens while opposing EU institutions. As of early August 2026, polling suggests that the PP, which has been leading the polls for a year, would have sufficient support to form a coalition with Vox.

Implications for the EU

According to the latest Eurobarometer, three-quarters of Spaniards remain pro-EU, and progressive governments have remained resilient in Spain despite Europe’s broader rightward populist shift. Yet Spain is far from immune from this – a truth laid bare by the rightward shift in four regional elections between December 2025 and May 2026 in the PP-governed regions of Extremadura, Castile and León, Aragón and Andalusia.

Despite a fractious national setting, Sánchez’s stances have made him a central figure of left-wing politics within the EU and have garnered him both praise and criticism across the bloc. He is known on the EU stage as one of the few heads of government to stand up to US President Donald Trump and to call out EU hypocrisy on its response to Israel’s military assaults in Gaza and elsewhere in the Middle East. His government has also been a main pillar within the “Friends of Cohesion” grouping that is pushing for further spending under the MFF. Under Sánchez’s leadership, Spain has often been a thorn in the side of the more right-leaning European Commission, as the Spanish Prime Minister does not hesitate to call out discrepancies between EU policy and values.

Sánchez’s growing unpopularity at home, and the sudden movement of migrants and asylum seekers from Morocco into Ceuta in July 2026, appears to be weaking his standing within the EU. This incident exposed a wider split on migration within the European Socialist family, as European leaders, notably Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, turned their backs on Sánchez. Migration could become a decisive issue when Spanish voters go to the polls next year.

For the EU, a PP-Vox coalition could further disrupt the balance among the European Parliament’s political groups that drive EU lawmaking – and potentially offset the loss of Viktor Orbán for the far right. Since the system of qualified majority voting (QMV) became fully applicable under the Lisbon Treaty in 2014, EU laws are adopted in the Council of the EU through a “double majority”, meaning that at least 55% of member states vote in favour, representing at least 65% of the EU’s population. A blocking minority can thus be established by just over 45% of the member states (or at least four member states), representing at least 35% of the EU population. With a population of 49 million, Spain accounts for 11% of the EU’s total population – enough to boost the far right’s ability to delay or block EU legislation.

However, a PP-Vox coalition would not necessarily act as a unified anti-EU bloc. In 2024, Vox left the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR) for Orbán’s Patriots for Europe (PfE). Vox subsequently adopted a more Russia-friendly voting position, while PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo made it clear that his party did not follow the same line. The two parties have also clashed over the EU-Mercosur deal, after Vox mocked the PP party over its “competing narratives” on the agreement.

The PP-Vox coalition formed in May 2026 after the regional election in Andalusia, Spain’s most populous autonomous community, offers an indication of how these tensions could play out. Despite PP being the larger of the two parties, Vox managed to secure “national priority” for the allocation of resources, housing and other benefits to Spanish-born people in the coalition agreement. Spain’s next election could thus determine whether Sánchez’s Spain remains a thorn in the EU’s rightward flank, or whether Vox will pull the Spanish electorate and the PP further to the right.

Sweden

Political context

Sweden is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of governance. Legislative power is vested in a unicameral parliament (Riksdag) elected for a four-year term. To win seats, a party must obtain either 4% of the national vote or 12% in a single constituency. On 13 September 2026, Swedes will go to the polls to decide what shape their government will take. The general elections will be held concurrently with regional and municipal council elections.

Sweden’s current national government consists of an alliance of centre-right parties (known as the Tidö parties) under Prime Minister Ulf Hjalmar Kristersson of the Moderate Party. The coalition was formed after the last general election in 2022, when the previous government led by the Social Democrats lost its majority, giving way to a minority coalition of the Moderates, Christian Democrats and Liberals. In a break with longstanding norms, the three parties made a cooperation agreement with the far-right Sweden Democrats (SD), previously considered pariahs in Swedish politics. Founded in 1988 by former Waffen-SS member Gustaf Ekstrom and led by Jimmie Åkesson since 2005, the SD espoused ethno-nationalist principles before undergoing a rebrand in the late 1990s. Until the incumbent government broke this “cordon sanitaire”, the party had been shut out of power by centre-right and left-wing parties.

In pre-election talks this year, Prime Minister Kristersson said he would allow the SD to enter government and to hold important ministerial positions in the areas of migration and integration. This comes as the current government’s popularity continues to fall and support has increased again for the Social Democratic Party.

Influence without office

The far-right Sweden Democrats’ entry into government would be a landmark moment for Swedish politics, but in many ways, they already have an impact on daily life, particularly for migrants and asylum seekers, and more broadly in terms of the rightward shift of politics. This is reflected, for example, in some of the policies of the supposedly centre-left Social Democrats, who, similar to the far-right, take a hardline stance on migration, integration and crime. Measures such as making Swedish language proficiency mandatory for gaining employment in public services or for obtaining citizenship, alongside a proposed “good behaviour” law, reflects the SD’s growing influence. However, the current configuration has not necessarily shored up support for the main government parties, and in some instances their stronger stance on stopping migration, such as the deportation of young people, have been met with public backlash.

As of 16 August, the highest-polling party according to Politico’s Poll of Polls is the Social Democratic Party at 31%, which is currently in opposition after narrowly losing the 2022 election. They are followed by the far-right Sweden Democrats at 19%. The governing Moderates follow at 17%, well ahead of their coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (6%) and Liberals (2%). The two leading parties are expected to receive about 50% of the total vote – but there is a notable gender gap in respective support: a survey by Statistics Sweden found that twice as many men as women support the far-right Sweden Democrats, while support for the Social Democrats is 10% higher among women than men.

Shrinking civic space

In its electoral observation report, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights noted a gradual decline in the broader democratic and human rights environment in Sweden, driven in part by a sustained reduction in public funding for civil society organisations. Notably, the implementation of the Sweden’s strategy for development cooperation with civil society has led to a stricter relationship between state and civil society with new demands for activity registries, reporting guidelines, and an expectation to contribute as ‘service providers’.

Researchers and CSOs alike have flagged concerns about the politicisation of funding agencies, notably the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). These agencies have become increasingly cautious and hesitant to speak out for fear of losing government funding. This politicisation may be a consequence of the growing influence of the far-right SD and a loss of transparency in policymaking.

The concerns extend beyond funding: civil society representatives have raised concerns regarding pending legislative developments with potential implications for freedom of expression and public participation. Such developments risk further eroding trust in democratic institutions, particularly among specific population groups, such as migrant communities and ethnic minorities.

Implications for the EU

A change in government in Sweden would not necessarily bring about a major shift in its relations with the EU. Sweden’s stance as a frugal nation when it comes to the MFF predates the current conservative coalition, and a shift to the left is unlikely to soften this position. If the far-right SD entered government, however, this could set a dangerous precedent for other centre-right parties across Europe who are considering alliances with far-right parties.

The looming threat of foreign interference, such as Russia’s election meddling in Germany, could work to the advantage of parties critical of EU integration, migration and those who hold a more ambiguous stance towards Moscow, a tendency the Sweden Democrats themselves exemplify. However, according to the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency, Swedish elections are not currently a priority target, and disinformation experts have reported that there is no significant evidence of Russian interference in the election campaign so far. Ultimately, whether or not the Sweden Democrats formally enter government, their steady normalisation within Swedish politics and the adoption of some of their key far-right policies is a cause for concern and emblematic of the broader rightward shift in Europe.