Just the Facts | Hungarian Elections

Background and results  

Parliamentary elections took place in Hungary on 12 April, with incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his right-wing populist Fidesz party facing up against Péter Magyar’s centre-right Tisza party. Fidesz is a member of the Patriots.eu in the European Parliament, while Tisza is a member of the European People’s Party. The election marked the first serious challenge to Orbán’s premiership in sixteen years and took place at an all-time low in relations between the EU and Hungary, due to clashes on migration, LGTBQ+ rights, and the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Hungary’s 199 members of parliament are elected for a four-year term under a hybrid system, where people vote for both a local candidate and a party. The final results combine winner-takes-all seats with proportional seats, with some adjustments to make the overall result more balanced. Since 2011, Hungary’s electoral system – which has been the object of concern for the European Parliament and European Commission – tends to systematically favour the winning parties in both stages, meaning that a victory by the Tisza party in the popular vote would not necessarily have guaranteed a parliamentary majority. 100 seats are needed for a simple majority, and 133 (two-thirds) for a supermajority. A party needs a minimum of 5% of the vote to win seats on the national list. 

The final results, with 98.9% of the vote counted, showed that Magyar’s Tisza party won 54.32% of the vote, or 138 of the 199 seats in the country’s parliament, corresponding to more than two-thirds and therefore a sufficient majority to amend the constitution and key laws. Orbán’s Fidesz party won 36.98% (55 seats), while the extreme-right Mi Hazánk party won 5.96% (six seats). At 77.8%, voter turnout was the highest in any election since 1989. Voters under the age of 30 played a decisive role, with independent polls showing that more than 60% of voters under 30 support Tisza, compared to 15% who support Fidesz.

Following the results, Magyar spoke of “liberating” Hungary from the Orbán regime, with widespread comparisons made between Orbán’s defeat and the Hungarian liberation movements of 1989 and 1956. The results were also a victory for Hungary’s civil society and independent media, which, despite years of repression, smears, funding cuts, attacks and criminalisation, continued to act in defence of democracy, documenting human rights violations and demanding accountability.

Orbán’s re-election campaign was marked by a strong focus on external factors, such as the war in Ukraine and Hungary’s relationship with Brussels. However, this focus did not pay off, as domestic issues such as the economy were ultimately of more concern for voters.

Orbán, continuing his government’s pattern of invoking the war in Ukraine to justify exceptional measures affecting fundamental rights, made various allegations about Ukrainian attempts to interfere in Hungary’s election. The campaign was dominated by Orbán’s veto of a €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine, which he defended by citing disruptions to the Druzhba pipeline, despite assurances from Ukraine that repairs would be completed in spring 2026. Shortly before the vote, U.S. Vice President JD Vance visited Budapest in what was widely viewed as an attempt to boost Orbán’s campaign. Vance heavily criticised the EU and lavished praise on Orbán; however, neither this visit nor a trip by Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Hungary in February succeeded in increasing support for Fidesz.

The election was tainted by reports of Russian interference. The independent Hungarian investigative outlet VSquare revealed that a team of Russian social media manipulation specialists was planted in the Russian Embassy in Budapest, with the complicity of Orbán’s government. At the same time, it emerged that Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was sharing confidential EU information with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and working on behalf of the Kremlin to lift sanctions on Russian entities. The electoral campaign also saw the widespread use of AI-generated dis- and misinformation by Orbán’s regime, widely portraying Magyar as an EU puppet or a Ukrainian agent, and miring him in a scandal involving a purported sex tape. Furthermore, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights found concerns about vote buying and intimidation tactics. Increased spending limits and a massive spending operation by Orbán’s government – leading to the highest state budget deficit since the Covid-19 pandemic – further distorted the election environment, making Tisza’s victory even more remarkable.

How pro-EU is Magyar?

Magyar – who has been an MEP since 2024, when he founded Tisza, and previously held various roles in Hungarian state institutions, including in Brussels – has pledged to take a more constructive and cooperative approach to EU policy. His focus will largely be on rebuilding relationships with European partners and unlocking frozen EU funds earmarked for Hungary. The Tisza party manifesto, presented in February, also commits to joining the Eurozone by 2030. One of Magyar’s first actions on his first day as prime minister elect was to speak with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, as well as several other European leaders such as Donald Tusk.

However, concerns remain that the incoming prime minister is not as pro-European as often presented and that European partners should not expect a complete U-turn in Hungary’s foreign policy. One Italian MEP pointed out that while Magyar ran against Orbán, he didn’t necessarily run against Orbánism – and that Magyar’s positions on migration and national sovereignty, for example, may be closer to those of Orbán than many realise. An EPC analysis of Tisza’s voting record in the European Parliament shows that while Tisza MEPs are broadly pro-EU in orientation, they have been willing to vote with Orbán’s Fidesz on politically sensitive issues such as Ukraine, agriculture and migration.

Regardless of Hungary’s regime change, it will likely remain difficult to reach consensus on certain issues at EU level. This applies especially to migration and enlargement, where Orbán was joined in his blocking position by the leaders of Czechia and Slovakia, for example.

Magyar’s positions on key EU policy issues 

EU sentiment in Hungary  

According to the Eurobarometer survey in 2025, 55% of Hungarians think that EU membership is a good thing for their country (slightly below the EU-wide average of 62%).  

Polling conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in March-April 2026 shows that 77% of Hungarian citizens believe that the next government should have a “very different approach” when it comes to the country’s position within the EU. Only 19% support a continuation of Orbán’s approach. 46% of Hungarians think that their country should align more closely with European partners when it comes to foreign policy and 66% support the country’s accession to the Eurozone. Fidesz supporters are split on Europe, with 45% supporting a change in Hungary’s position towards Brussels. ECFR surmises that EU bashing seems to have lost its mobilising power for Orbán and Fidesz, who replaced this with anti-Ukraine rhetoric during the election campaign. 

EU response to Magyar’s election

Magyar’s victory was welcomed by leaders across Europe, who feared that another Orbán victory he would have continued to block EU support for Ukraine and to derail EU budget negotiations. Persistent breaches of the rule of law in Hungary under Orbán’s regime have also been an ongoing concern for the EU, with the European Parliament warning of judicial interference, corruption, misuse of EU funds, and attacks on civil society.

What happens next?

Magyar is expected to take over as prime minister on 5 May 2026. Until then, Orbán will remain caretaker prime minister. Magyar’s first foreign policy visits will be to Warsaw, Vienna and Brussels.

The new government faces the significant task of addressing the country’s economic problems, particularly inflation, with price increases of 57% since 2020 – nearly double the rate of the EU bloc as a whole. It is conceivable that dealing with these domestic issues will be a more urgent priority for Magyar than rebuilding EU relationships.

Moreover, dismantling the legacy of a sixteen-year-old regime will be a lengthy process – and will require the support of EU funds. Over the past 16 years, Fidesz captured key institutions, from local governments to the constitutional court and the high court to state media. In his victory speech, Magyar called on all “puppets” of the Orbán regime to leave their offices, naming the president of the Supreme Court, the general prosecutor and other top figures in the government. However, a decision on whether Hungarian EU Commissioner and Fidesz loyalist Olivér Várhelyi, the EU’s Health and Animal Welfare Commissioner, will remain in power lies with Commission President von der Leyen. Removing a commissioner would be unprecedented. Magyar’s government faces the considerable task of rebuilding trust in state institutions, ensuring rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, and creating an enabling environment for civil society, media, judiciary and minority groups.

Magyar’s approach to various EU policy issues – most pressingly, the institutional reforms required to unlock EU funds and the €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine – will give early indications of how the new Hungarian government plans to engage at EU level. The regime change in Hungary may provide some momentum to EU decision-making – but ultimately, as outlined above, Magyar’s Tisza does not fundamentally differ from the Orbán government on certain core issues. Moreover, as other illiberal governments such as Czechia and Slovakia step out from under Orbán’s cover, new dynamism on subjects such as enlargement seems unlikely.

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