Just the Facts | Key takeaways from recent national elections in Europe

Czech Elections

Czechia operates as a parliamentary republic with a bicameral parliament, a president with limited (but still meaningful) powers and a Prime Minister who oversees the government. The Chamber of Deputies (Poslanecká sněmovna) is made up of 200 members who are elected for 4 years and form the government. The Senate (Senát) is made up of 81 senators, who are elected for 6 years. It can delay legislation but cannot veto it permanently. Officially, the president (currently Petr Pavel) appoints the Prime Minister (usually the leader of the largest party, though coalition makeup plays a large role) and his Cabinet, who then must secure a vote of confidence in parliament to be fully ratified.  

 On 3 and 4 October 2025, Czech citizens went to the polls in what was a highly contested election. The previous coalition of SPOLU (Together) and PirSTAN (Pirati a Starostové) was broadly pro-EU. It largely supported and accepted EU directives and worked within the EU on issues of foreign policy and climate. It supported the Czech Ammunition Initiative which was a collaborative effort between Czechia, the defence industry, and international partners to address Ukrainian ammunition shortages in the wake of decreased US funding. SPOLU received 23.36% of the vote in the 2025 election (52 seats) and PirSTAN received 11.23% (22 seats) ruling out the prospect of renewing the coalition. 

Andrej Babiš’s ANO party emerged victorious, winning 34.51% of the vote and 80 seats. While this result was predicted, the election marks a worrying shift in Czechia’s attitude towards the EU and presents likely complications for Brussels, in its future dealings with the country. However, this isn’t Czechia’s first populist government, Babiš and ANO were previously involved in a mixed coalition of the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Christian and Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL) in the 2017-2021 government. Following the October 2025 result, Babiš has sought to form a coalition with two smaller right-wing parties, Motoristé sobě and SPD, both of which advocate hard right, Eurosceptic policies. Babiš has described himself as a “Trumpist” and is seeking to model his premiership on that of the US president’s. 

 Motoristé sobě (Motorists for themselves) are an anti-environmentalist party who campaigned against many of the EU directives surrounding the phase out of combustion engines and the Green Transition. Their economic policies focus on reduced government spending and decreasing the deficit and taxes. Motoristé sobě also advocate for minimal government interference in the economy, which has put it at odds with ANO, who ran the election on a populist economic platform that seeks to increase spending in many departments.  

 SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy) was founded in 2015 by Tomio Okamura. The party has continually advocated hard right, Eurosceptic and anti-immigration policies, positioning it further right than ANO. They have also pushed for leaving the European Union (something Babiš has ruled out). The party has been the source of much controversy in Czechia due to their use of racist imagery in its campaign and their links to Moscow. 

 On the 3 of November ANO, Motoristé sobě and the SPD signed a coalition agreement enabling the formation of a coalition government with Andrej Babiš as Prime Minister. The proposed coalition agreement outlines an increased focus on domestic issues, including tax breaks and benefits for young families as well as an increase in public sector wages. The programme also seeks to roll back previous foreign policy commitments to Ukraine, which became a flashpoint for voters during the election. Both the SPD and ANO have previously called into question Czechia’s financial support to Ukraine to varying degrees. The SPD has also continuously questioned Czechia’s membership of the EU; however, Babiš has repeatedly stated that he is not interested in holding referenda on Czechia’s membership of the EU and the current proposed plan for government does not include provisions for this. 

Although the details relating to the programme for government and cabinet members are still being negotiated between the three parties, it is expected that ANO will seek to temper the hard-line Eurosceptic inclinations of its two coalition partners, while also pushing for its populist economic policies. In the breakdown of ministries, ANO will hold nine, including Finance, Industry, Health, Labour, Education, the Interior, Regional Development and Justice. SPD will nominate ministers for Defence, Agriculture and Transport. Motoristé sobě will lead Foreign Affairs, Culture, the Environment and Sport.  

What’s at stake? 

The breakdown of these ministries puts the Eurosceptic and Russia-friendly SPD in charge of defence at a critical time for European support in Ukraine. It also places the climate sceptic Motoristé sobě in charge of the Environment Ministry. While ANO will still have huge sway over the policy direction of the new Czech government when it is formed, the rhetoric of both its coalition partners suggests that it will face increased friction with the EU going forward. Czechia’s obligations under the EU’s Green Deal and further decarbonisation look most likely to be under threat, as Motoristé sobě and SPD control the portfolios related to the environment and to transport. Motoristé sobě campaigned heavily on the rejection of the Green Deal, which they view as destabilising to Czechia’s energy security. They also view ongoing efforts to decarbonise Europe as a danger in the form of raw-material dependence on China.  

It is clear that the new Czech government will have a markedly more inward focus. ANO and Babiš’s main priority will be slowing inflation and improving the quality of life for the middle class through their populist financial policies. To do that they will need to keep the SPD and Motoristé sobě onside. The EU can therefore expect more friction in the future, as ANO lets its coalition partners take the lead on issues it views as external or secondary.  

Election results

Moldovan Elections

The Republic of Moldova operates as a unicameral parliamentary representative democratic republic. The elected government exercises executive powers, while a ceremonial president acts as head of state. While Moldova has used a variety of electoral systems in the past, the 2025 elections were conducted using a closed list, proportional representation system within a single nationwide constituency. This means citizens vote for the party of their preference and parties are then granted seats based on their proportion of the vote. Parties construct their own “closed” lists, meaning that candidates placed at the top of the list by the party will be elected first and so on. 

On 28 September 2025, Moldovans went to the polls to elect a new government in what was a critical election for the country’s future. The pro-EU party PAS (Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate) won an overall majority in the 2021 elections. This allowed them to pursue a closer relationship with Brussels and the rest of the EU. In March 2022 Moldova applied for EU membership. It was officially recognised as a candidate in June 2022 and began accession negotiations in June 2024 with the aim of joining the EU by 2030. In October 2024, Moldovans narrowly passed a referendum that enshrined EU membership in their constitution. The campaign was fraught with allegations of Russian interference and disinformation. The referendum was ultimately passed by a margin of 0.7%, highlighting just how contentious future elections would likely be in the country.  

The dominance of PAS across all sectors of Moldovan government has allowed it to advance their pro-EU agenda at speed., however it has also left them open to criticism on domestic issues, with many Moldovans facing increasing economic hardship and energy insecurity against a backdrop of slow progress on government reform. This, along with the threat of interference, fed into fears in the run-up to the 2025 election that the pro-Russian BEP (Patriotic Electoral Bloc) could strip away their majority come election day. 

Moldova has faced consistent Russian interference in previous elections. Its proximity to Ukraine as well as its relationship with the semi-autonomous region of Transnistria has served to make it a Russian target. The 2025 elections served as a testing ground for Russian electoral interference. A combination of paid public protests, vote buying, attacks on IT systems and an influx of disinformation and AI-generated content were used by Russia in an attempt to tilt elections in favour of pro-Russian parties and interests. In January 2025, Russia ceased supplying oil to the Transnistria region, causing the closure of all industrial companies except food producers. Moldova, which was reliant on both Russian oil and energy production from Moldova’s only energy plant in Transnistria, faced an immediate energy crisis. While the reasons for this are also partially due to Ukraine halting the export of Russian oil and gas through their pipelines, it further underscored the precarious nature of Moldovan security and their relationship with Russia in an election year. It also presents a further challenge for PAS in its attempt to cut ties with Russia and align itself with the EU. 

The results of the September elections returned PAS with an overall majority. They did not achieve their previous high of 52.8% (63 seats) but still managed to achieve 50.2% (55 seats) giving them a crucial majority. BEP achieved 24.2% (26 seats), far less than was expected. Given the level of Russian interference that the Moldovan electorate faced, the results have provided PAS with a strong mandate to pursue their goal of European membership, while also serving as a rebuke to Russian electoral interference. A key factor in PAS’s success has been their ability to disrupt Russian interference across Moldovan society. This included adopting new legal adjustments aimed at targeting vote-buying, covert campaigning, and unreported financing. The role of the Moldovan diaspora was also a key factor in ensuring PAS success. Across five countries (Italy, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Romania), the Moldovan diaspora voted between 75% and 88% for PAS. This provided a strong bulwark against the BEP and was crucial in PAS victory. 

What’s at stake? 

Having maintained their parliamentary majority, PAS will be able to continue pushing for further alignment with the EU. However, they will need to simultaneously progress their policies on governance and corruption reform in order to maintain their popularity. Risks of increased Russian aggression still prevail, with some fearing that this may turn more physical as PAS advance their goals. For the EU the Moldovan elections have shown that enlargement is still possible in the face of Russian aggression. Despite Russian attempts to influence and disrupt, the prospect of EU accession has continued to gain traction within the country and has bolstered the government’s ability to combat corruption and foreign influence. The EU will be focusing on decreasing Moldova’s dependence on Russian oil and energy, while also ensuring the Moldovan economy remains stable. Without reforms in its energy dependence and its corruption legislation, EU accession will become increasingly difficult. 

Moldovan Election Results

Dutch Elections

The Netherlands’ parliamentary system is a bicameral legislature, featuring the Eerste Kamer (Senate) and the Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives). It operates as a constitutional monarchy with the monarch as the official head of state. The Netherlands uses a party list form of proportional representation, with the electorate voting for a party within a national constituency. The parties’ own lists are formally set, with the party leader at the top and a non-political “celebrity candidate” often at the bottom (the ‘lijstduwer’ or ‘list pusher’). All votes for candidates are counted as votes for the party and there is no fixed electoral threshold for achieving representation. To gain one seat in the Dutch House of Representatives, the only threshold a party needs to achieve is the number of valid votes cast divided by 150, which is the number of seats in the chamber. Remaining seats are allocated using the D’Hondt method, which allocates seats by dividing each party’s vote total by a series of divisors (1, 2, 3, 4…) and then awarding seats one-by-one to the highest resulting scores. 

Given its system, Dutch elections are crowded affairs. 27 parties contested the October 2025 elections, with 15 parties obtaining seats. The previous election in 2023 saw Geert Wilders far right-PVV (Party for Freedom) top the polls with 23.49% of the vote and 37 seats. The 2023 election was called after the Netherlands longest-serving leader, Mark Rutte, resigned after failing to agree measures on migration. Wilders and PVV’s success reflected increased frustration amongst Dutch voters over the government’s response to migration. The subsequent government was formed with PVV, VVD (the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and the BBB (Farmer-Citizen Movement). Independent and long-time civil servant Dick Schoof was selected to be prime minister after a lengthy negotiation period. At the time, the election reflected a wider European surge in far-right parties, with Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy having come to power the previous year.  

The backdrop to the 2025 elections was that of a divided right-wing Dutch government and a fragmented electorate. The government under Dick Schoof had been in office less than a year when Wilders and the PVV demanded their coalition partners agree “immediately” to their “10-point immigration plan”. The move was vilified by other members of the coalition who viewed it as “irresponsible and incomprehensible”. The polls, prior to PVV’s departure from the coalition, showed the party in a tight race with several of the main parties.  

As the campaign took shape, several parties emerged as the main contenders. D66, under pro-EU Rob Jetten, framed itself as the liberal antidote to years of turbulence, while the VVD, led by Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius, sought to bring stability to the centre-right after its bruising spell in government. On the left, the united GroenLinks-PvdA (GL-PvdA) bloc aimed to present a coherent progressive alternative, focusing on climate and social justice. Opposing them, Wilders’ PVV continued to command a substantial base despite internal strains, ensuring the far-right remained strong.  

The election saw PVV drop 11 seats, while D66 and Jetten surged from 9 seats in 2023, to finish level with PVV at 26 seats each. VVD took 22 seats (-2), GL-PvdA took 20 seats (-5) and the CDA ended with 18 seats (+13). The election was a humbling experience for PVV, who saw some of the heaviest losses of any of the parties. Jetten and D66 surged in the polls by offering a newer, more optimistic view of politics, in stark contrast to Wilders and PVV. As of  15 December, no agreements had been made on the shape of the new government. D66 and the CDA have been heavily rumoured to be in coalition talks to form the basis of the next government. With their combined seats they would still need another party or parties to reach the threshold of a 76-seat majority, but both parties have stressed that time is of the essence. Both VVD (previous coalition partners of PVV) and the GL-PvdA hold enough seats to give a prospective government a comfortable coalition. However, VVD has repeatedly said it will not go into a government with the left-wing GL-PvdA, favouring the far-right JA21 as a prospective coalition partner instead. 

The Dutch elections demonstrated a repudiation of the chaos and infighting that had dogged the PVV led government and heavily damaged Wilders’ credibility as a viable partner within a Dutch government. The surge of support in favour of D66 can largely be attributed to their ability to offer an alternative to PVV, which they did by setting out a positive message about the future of the Netherlands and Dutch politics. From an EU standpoint, Wilders and PVV’s losses mean that the Dutch figurehead of Euroscepticism has suffered a significant setback.  

What’s at stake? 

Rob Jetten’s D66 has presented a contrastingly positive attitude towards the EU, with Jetten citing that he wants the Netherlands to “stop saying ‘no’ by default and start saying ‘yes’ to doing more together”. D66 has cited the need to increase EU integration on overarching issues such as defence, trade and common values. Having a pro-EU voice at the head of the Dutch government will make interactions between the two significantly more cordial, but given the fragmented nature of Dutch politics, the actual relationship will be shaped by whoever Jetten and D66 choose to go into coalition with. Wilders and PVV will also be waiting in the wings. Despite losing seats, PVV remains joint largest party and the wider vote share amongst radical-right and Eurosceptic parties remained stable at just under a third of the electorate. While the result is a positive for EU integration, it does not mean Dutch voters have left Eurosceptic parties behind.